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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ONLINE
VOTE SWAPPING
Marc J. Randazza*
No body politic worthy of being called a democracy entrusts the
selection of leaders to a process of auction or barter.'
Censorship is the bastard child of technology.2
I. INTRODUCTION
The boondoggles of the 2000 presidential election were not lim-
ited to dimpled chads, standards of review, or Supreme Court Jus-
tices making a mockery of federalism. The forgotten issue of the
2000 election, and the issue that stands to impact presidential politics
in 2004, took place in cyberspace. While an election close enough
for hanging chads to decide the outcome is not likely to recur, online
vote swapping vill be back in 2004.
As the 2000 campaign reached its climax, some renegade sup-
porters of Green Party candidate, Ralph Nader, countered critics'
charges that they were handing the election to Bush3 by creating
* Juris Doctor, Georgetown University Law Center, 2000. The author
wishes to thank Michelle Prettie and Professor Bill Chamberlin for their guid-
ance and assistance. The author wishes to extend extra special thanks to Pro-
fessor Karen List of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst for her tute-
lage, guidance, and friendship without which this Article would never have
been written.
1. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982).
2. Robert Corn-Revere, New Technology and the First Amendment:
Breaking the Cycle of Repression, 17 HASTINGS COM. & ENT. L.L 247, 264
(1994).
3. See Rebecca Cook, Nader Urges Washington Supporters to Ignore
Pressure from Democrats, NEwSFLASH, at http.//www.oregonlive.com
/newsflashlindex.ssf?/cgifreegetstoryssf.cgi?o1325_BCWA-Nader&news
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Web sites encouraging vote swapping.4 In short, vote swapping was
where a Nader supporter in a hotly contested state agreed to vote for
Al Gore if a Gore supporter in an uncontested state voted for Ralph
Nader. The objects of this exercise were to help deliver five percent
of the popular vote to the Green Party so that they could receive
matching federal funds for the 2004 presidential election, while si-
multaneously working to prevent a George W. Bush presidency.
5
With the election less than a week away and the poll margins
closer than any election in recent history, the secretaries of state of
Oregon and California acted to snuff out the online vote-swapping
movement. California Secretary of State Bill Jones sent an e-mail to
Jim Cody,6 co-creator of VoteSwap2000.org7 -- a site promoting this
voting behavior-threatening prosecution under California Election
Code sections 185218 and 185229 and Penal Code section 182.10
Similarly, Oregon Secretary of State Bill Bradbury claimed that on-
line vote swapping, even without the exchange of money, violated
Oregon's election laws." Further, Bradbury sent desist letters to six
&newsflash-oregon (last visited Nov. 3, 2000); see also Jeff Mapes, Nader-
Gore Choice Disrupts Unity Among Leftist Activists, THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 2,
2000, at A13 (discussing the infighting among Green Party members).
4. See, e.g., http://www.nadertrader.org/; http://www.voteexchange.org/;
http://www.voteswap2000.org; http://www.winwincampaign.org/.
5. See Lisa Napoli, Trading Nader, Gore Votes, MSNBC, Oct. 31, 2000,
at http://www.msnbc.com/news/482104.aspcp1 =1.
6. See id.
7. See ACLU Defends Voters Against California, Oregon Backs Away
from Allegations of Vote Trading, at http://www.voteswap2000.org (last vis-
ited Nov. 3, 2000).
8. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18521(a) (West 1996) ("A person shall not directly
or through any other person receive, agree, or contract for, before, during or
after an election, any money, gift, loan, or other valuable consideration... be-
cause he or any other person... [v]oted, agreed to vote, refrained from voting,
or agreed to refrain from voting for any particular person or measure.").
9. Id. § 18522(a)(2) ("Neither a person nor a controlled committee shall
directly or through any other person or controlled committee pay, lend, or
contribute, or offer or promise to pay, lend, or contribute, any money or other
valuable consideration to or for any voter or to or for any other person to ...
[i]nduce any voter to... [v]ote or refrain from voting at an election for any
particular person or measure.").
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 182 (West 1999 & Supp. 2001) (criminal conspir-
acy).
11. See Oregon Warns Web Sites that Promote Vote Trading, THE RECORD
(Bergen County, N.J.), Nov. 3, 2000, at A26.
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vote-swapping sites informing them that sanctions would be imposed
if the sites facilitated vote trading.
12
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that Ameri-
cans have the right to the core value of free speech in a public forum
on matters of political importance. 13 With the rise of the Internet as a
powerful medium of mass communication, this core value does not
change.14 Now, anyone with a dial-up account "can become a town
crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soap-
box." 15  With this almost instantaneous democratization of mass
communication through this new medium, social and political insti-
tutions and leaders are consistently confused about how to cope with
questions of freedom of speech, association, and assembly in the
context of cyberspace.' 6 This fact became starkly apparent, with
great repercussions, in the waning days of the 2000 presidential race
when the secretaries of state of Oregon and California may have
tipped the scales in the closest U.S. election in history.
Were vote-swapping sites truly corrupting the electoral process?
Does this conduct fall within the boundaries of political speech and
freedom of assembly, subject to the highest level of First Amend-
ment protection? Or is it the same as buying a vote and contravening
the one-citizen, one-vote ideal? Did the secretaries of state of Cali-
fornia and Oregon step on the most precious of American rights and
alter history in the process?
12. See Scott Harris, ACLU Takes Up Vote-Swapping Fight, THE
STANDARD, Nov. 2, 2000, at http://www.thestandard.comtarticleldisplay!
0,1151,19890,00.html [hereinafter Harris, ACLU Takes Up Vote].
13. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOvERNMENT 22-27, 94 (1948); see also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Prin-
ciples and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 23 (1971)
("[E]ven without a first amendment... a representative democracy... would
be meaningless without freedom to discuss government and its policies. Free-
dom for political speech could and should be inferred even if there were no
first amendment.").
14. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (stating that restrictions
on Web site content are afforded the same protection as traditional print).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 870 (stating that the "indecent transmission"
and "patently offensive display" of the Communications Decency Act abridge
the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee).
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This Article will introduce the reader to the concept and practice
of vote swapping. It will then examine the chilling effect of the
threats of prosecution and its possible consequences. The actions of
the Oregon and California secretaries of state will be analyzed under
their respective state laws and constitutions. Finally, vote swapping
will be examined under both federal election law and the U.S. Con-
stitution.
II. DEMOCRACY IN THE INTERNET AGE, VOTE SWAPPING, AND
ONLINE COALITIONS
A. PoliticalAction in Cyberspace
Online networks have created an unprecedented means of rapid
global communication.1 7 As the grandfather of all computer net-
works, the Internet provides citizens with "the opportunity to engage
in an unprecedented communal process of sharing information and
creating new knowledge."1a
In recent years, political candidates, parties, and political action
committees have recognized the Internet's potential as "a powerful
campaign tool with the potential to significantly influence the out-
come of federal elections."' 19 The massive communicative power of
the Internet makes it a super-broadcasting tool that allows anyone to
jump into the political fray, regardless of economic means.
20
For example, in July of 1989, a group of Chinese students living
in the U.S. organized a lobbying campaign to persuade Congress to
pass a bill that would protect them from Communist Chinese threats
17. See Vincent Casaregola & Robert A. Cropf, Virtual Town Halls: Using
Computer Networks to Improve Public Discourse and Facilitate Service Deliv-
ery, RESEARCH AND REFLECTION, Oct. 1998, at http://www.gonzaga.edu/rr/
v4nl/cropf.htm (last updated Nov. 2, 1998).
18. Use of the Internet for Campaign Activity, 64 Fed. Reg. 60,360, 60,360
(Nov. 5, 1999) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107,
109, 110, 114, and 116).
19. Id.; see also Mark S. Bonchek, Grassroots in Cyberspace: Recruiting
Members on the Internet or Do Computer Networks Facilitate Collective Ac-
tion? A Transactional Approach (Apr. 1995) at http://www.entry.tm/
virtuellegemeinschaft/text/bonch95a.htm (discussing how computer-mediated
communication facilitates political action).
20. See Bonchek, supra note 19.
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of reprisal for their support of the Tiananmen Square demonstra-
tors.z l The lobbying committee used e-mail and Internet newsgroups
to organize 20,000 students at 160 colleges and universities and to
gain widespread media attention with only four day's notice. 2 The
bill passed, but the students would never have been able to mount
this effort without the use of telecommunications to coordinate the
disparate chapters within their coalition.
23
Also in 1989, a group of twenty activists in Santa Monica, Cali-
fornia, organized the SHWASHLOCK-showers, washers, and
lockers-movement online.24 "They eventually overcame neighbor-
hood and City Council resistance, obtaining a $150,000 line item in
the budget and approval for converting an old bath house to a facility
for the homeless."25 The group later created a job bank cooperative
for the homeless and campaigned to include Santa Monica schools in
an international program to educate school children about electronic
communication.2 6 A follow-up survey of the activists revealed that
"it was the online process that enabled the group to plan and execute
these various efforts."27
Similarly, the Christian Coalition used its Web site on July 7,
1994, to urge its allies to contact Congress and demand an end to
federal support for the National Endowment for the Arts ("NEA").
28
Three days later, a group of freshman Republican members of Con-
gress called for an end to federal support for the NEA.29 Analysts
credit the online coalition-building power of the Internet for this
victory.
30
Despite Bonchek's and Schwartz's claims that the above exam-
ples could not have been accomplished without the Internet, they







27. Ed Schwartz, NetActivism: How Citizens Use the Internet, at http:l
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Coalition owned a television network, or possessed enough funds to
buy sufficient airtime to make their cause heard nationwide, the same
thing could have been accomplished. In these examples, the Internet
brought power to people who otherwise might not have had such a
powerful voice, but these actions were not unique to cyberspace. In
other words, the Internet acted as a tool of democratization, but these
actions were not entirely Internet dependent.
The next level of Internet usage as a political action tool is the
use of the "space" of cyberspace as a "place" for the creation of on-
line coalitions.31 Bart-Jan Flos of the Politeia Network for Citizen-
ship and Democracy in Europe suggested the use of the Internet to
form coalitions led by already-elected politicians.32 Bonchek and
Schwartz also demonstrated the strength of the Internet as a democ-
ratizing surrogate for capital in the organization of grassroots politi-
cal movements.
33
However, the idea of the Internet as a tool for political organi-
zation evolved into a new creature in November of 2000. Rather
than an alternative to phone banks and expensive advertising, Inter-
net vote swapping became a unique, online, coalition-building
movement with the potential for massive political repercussions.
B. Online Vote Swapping
Vote swapping is a variation on a common legislative practice.
In the United States Senate and House of Representatives, members
of Congress routinely support their colleagues' bills in exchange for
support for their own. This coalition building was never before a
practical issue in presidential electoral politics, because of the logis-
tical impossibility of creating a citizen vote swap on a scale that
31. See Philip Giordano, Invoking Law as a Basis for Identity in Cyber-
space, 1998 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (suggesting that the Internet is
not just a means of communication, but a "place"), available at
http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/98_STLRl/; see also Linda M. Hara-
sim, Networlds: Networks as Social Space, in GLOBAL NETWoRKs:
COMPUTERS AND INTERNAnTONAL COMMUNICATION 15, 16-17 (Linda M.
Harasim ed., 1993).
32. See Bart-Jan Flos, Teledemocracy VIII: The Formation of On-line Coa-
litions, at http://www.politeia.net/newsletter/ (Oct. 1998).
33. See Bonchek, supra note 19.
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could have any significant impact. Enter the Internet, and enter the
freak circumstances of the 2000 presidential race.
Building an online vote-swapping coalition is simple and en-
tirely Internet dependent. In the 2000 presidential election, for ex-
ample, if a voter wished to support Ralph Nader and lived in a hotly
contested "swing state" such as Florida-assuming that the Nader
supporter would have rather seen Al Gore elected than George
Bush34 -the voter faced a quandary. Should Nader supporters vote
their conscience, and contribute to their third choice, at the expense
of their second choice?35 The alternative was to contact a Gore sup-
porter in a state that was uncontested, such as Massachusetts. Rec-
ognizing that Gore would have easily carried Massachusetts, the
Nader supporter in Florida and the Gore supporter in Massachusetts
could agree that taking a few votes from Gore in a Democratic
stronghold would have no impact on the apportionment of Massa-
chusetts' electoral votes. Therefore, the Gore supporter in Massachu-
setts could agree to vote for Ralph Nader, thus, giving the Green
Party one more vote toward the magic five percent they sought.36 In
turn, the Nader supporter in Florida could cast their vote for Gore,
thus, giving Gore that much more support in a hotly contested and
ultimately pivotal state.
The concept of online vote swapping first appeared in a Village
Voice article by James Ridgeway in September, 2000.37 Ridgeway
34. The assumption that all Nader voters would have voted for Gore was
false. Twenty-three percent of Nader supporters said that they would have
voted for Bush had Nader not been running. See David Ruppe & Peter
Dizikes, Will Nader Fare Well? How Strong Will Green Party Candidate's
Support Be on Election Day?, at http://abcnews.go.comsections/politics/
DailyNews/naderthreat_001026.html (Oct. 26, 2000).
35. The notion that a vote for Nader was a vote for Bush was not 100% ac-
curate. A vote for Nader would have kept a left-leaning vote from Gore, but
did not actually place a vote in Bush's totals. Therefore, it was a half vote at
best.
36. See, e.g., Charles Pope, 'Take a Stand,' Nader Urges; Seattle Crowd
Told That Gore Is Unworthy of Vote Switch and a Captive of Corporations,
SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 3, 2000, at Al ("Nader's aim is to collect
5 percent of the vote nationally to establish the Green Party as a major political
organization. 'It's time to take a stand,' he said, 'We want to build a permanent
new party of citizens who have been closed out by their own government."').
37. See James Ridgeway, Beatification of Ralph, VILLAGE VOICE, (Sept. 27
Oct. 3, 2000) at http://vww.villagevoice.comlissuesl0039/ridgeway3.shtml.
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reported that, since the election promised to be so close, Nader sup-
porters were concerned that their efforts could bring about a conser-
vative victory.38 Many believed that if Nader were not running, Gore
would have been more securely in the lead in the late days of the
campaign. 3 Concerned with being branded as spoilers of Gore's
chances in what was never more than a two-way race, Nader sup-
porters got to work. On October 1, 2000, Steve Yoder, a Washing-
ton, D.C. technical writer, launched Voteexchange.org, 40 an Internet
vote-swapping site.
By October 2, 2000, conservative voters got into the act as well.
On that day a message board for FreeRepublic.com encouraged Lib-
ertarians, Constitutional Party Supporters, and Reform Party voters
to swap their votes with Bush voters in Massachusetts, New York,
and Washington, D.C.41 Despite these efforts, the conservative vote
swappers did not gain the same momentum and media attention that
the "Nader traders" managed to garner.
The idea did not truly catch fire until an American University
constitutional law professor, Jamin Raskin, promoted the idea in the
MSN online magazine Slate on October 24, 2000.42 In his article,
Professor Raskin explained that the presidential race had narrowed
by that date so that "a strong showing by Ralph Nader in ten swing
states could help give George W. Bush the 270 Electoral College
votes he need[ed] to win., 43 He believed that this presented hun-
dreds of thousands of progressive Nader supporters in swing states
with a dilemma.44 After the publication of his article, hits to the
various vote-swapping sites increased exponentially. VoteEx-
change.org arranged 500 swaps in one week;45 VoteSwap2000.org
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., Ruppe & Dizikes, supra note 34.
40. See Greens and Democrats: Vote Smart! Join the Vote Exchange Pro-
gram!, at http://www.votexchange.org/vote0O1.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2001).
41. See Vote Swapping! Attn: Bush, Buchanan, Browne, Phillips Voters!,
at http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a39d85fb603a8.htm (last visited Oct. 2,
2000).




45. See Greens and Democrats, supra note 40.
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arranged 500 trades in twenty-four hours, and in its short life ex-
changed more than 5000 votes.46 Similarly, Votetrader.org claimed
that it arranged 15,000 vote exchanges in several battleground
states.
47
What raised the ire of the secretaries of state of Oregon and
California, however, was not the mere advocacy of trading votes.
Although both offices acknowledged the illegality of citizens con-
tracting to trade votes, neither sought, after November 3, to restrain
the mere suggestion of doing such a thing.48 The Web sites that both
states targeted were the sites that facilitated the process by the use of
computerized databases.49 Users of these Web sites gave their state
of residence, their preferred candidates, and their preferred major-
party candidates.50 The program then indicated to the user whether
the state was a contested or a noncontested state.51 Users then en-
tered their e-mail addresses and the computerized database would
find a matching voter in another state and send e-mail to each
matched voter.52 At that point, it became the voter's responsibility to
agree to swap votes.
53
Both secretaries of state regarded this online, automated net-
working as the application of undue influence in the voting process,
in direct violation of their respective state's laws.M However, it was
the position of the secretaries of state that sites espousing the same
political message were permissible under California55 and Oregon
56
46. See Napoli, supra note 5.
47. See Scott Harris, 'Nader Traders' May Have Affected Outcome in Flor-
ida, at http'J/www.cnn.com/2000TECH/computing/l 1/17/nader.traders.help
.gore.idg/index.html (Nov. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Harris, 'Nader Traders].







54. See OR. REV. STAT. § 260.665 (1999); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 18521(a),
18522(a) (West 1996).
55. The California Secretary of State said that ,vw.winvincampaign.org
was permissible under California law. See Burden of Proof (CNN television
broadcast, Nov. 2, 2000).
56. Letter from Paddy McGuire, Chief of Staff, Oregon Elections Division
to Jeffrey Cardille, operator of wwv.nadertrader.com and www.nadertrader
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law. It was the conduct of "brokering" votes that was explicitly pro-
hibited under California law,57 and the application of "undue influ-
ence 58 that ran afoul of Oregon law.59
When vote-swap participants agreed to exchange their votes,
they exercised their rights of free speech and association related to a
campaign for political office. Each voter convinced the other to
change his or her vote in order to achieve a common political goal.
There was no exchange of money or goods and there was no en-
forceable binding arrangement.
60
The secretaries of state certainly achieved their goal to end the
practice when they moved against the vote-swapping sites. Although
nobody was certain whether vote swapping was constitutionally
protected or not, the chilling effect, brought about by the desist let-
ters sent by the secretaries of state of Oregon and California to vote-
swapping Web sites, was immediate and possibly of great conse-
quence.
III. THE CHILLING EFFECT
A. What Is the Chilling Effect?
The Supreme Court defines "chilling effect" as the "collateral ef-
fect of inhibiting the freedom of expression, by making the individ-
ual the more reluctant to exercise it. ' 61 This effect impacts free
.org, (Nov. 3, 2000) (on file with the author).
57. For a discussion of the California Secretary of State's actions under
California law, see infra Part IV.A.
58. OR REV. STAT. § 260.665(1) (1999) ("As used in this section, undue in-
fluence" means force, violence, restraint or the threat of it, inflicting injury,
damage, harm, loss of employment or other loss or the threat of it, fraud or
giving or promising to give money, employment or other thing of value."); see
also Oregon Republican Party v. State, 717 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Or. Ct. App.
1986) ("[T]he promise of an advantage as a result of performing the desired
act; it is persuasion coupled with a benefit or the absence of a threatened det-
riment."). For a full discussion of this concept under Oregon law, see infra
Part IV.B.
59. For a discussion of the secretary of state's actions under Oregon law,
see infra Part IV.B.
60. See Brief for Plaintiffs at 5, Porter v. Jones (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-
11700).
61. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151-54 (1959) (holding that an ordi-
nance prohibiting the possession of "obscene" or "indecent" material in a
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association rights,62 as well as free speech rights.63 A chilling effect
arises when citizens are apprehensive to exercise their rights to free
expression or free association due to the threat of the expense and in-
convenience of criminal prosecution.
64
Of course, any threat of criminal or civil prosecution will neces-
sarily "chill" the activity it threatens. For example, dicta in Near v.
Minnesota instructed us that "publication of the sailing dates of
transports or the number and location of troops" may be lawfilly re-
strained.65 Therefore, it is not to say that a chilling effect is by defi-
nition unconstitutional, but its existence creates a question as to
whether the effect was legitimate due to the fact that it stifled "the
flow of democratic expression and controversy at one of its chief
sources.n
66
B. Was There a Chilling Effect?
The California and Oregon secretaries of state's letters demand-
ing the shutdown of vote-swapping sites sent shivers through cyber-
space that affected Web site operators nationwide. 67 The day after
California contacted VoteSwap2000.org, the Web site contained the
following message: "We are not lawyers .... Our advice is to err
on the side of caution, and if you can't determine for sure that you are
bookstore was unconstitutional due to its tendency to inhibit not only unpro-
tected, but protected expression).
62. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 482-83, 493-94 (1965)
(holding that a statute defining "subversive organization" was unconstitutional
due to the potential "chilling effect" on defendant's associational rights).
63. See Near v. Minnestota, 283 U.S. 697, 720-23 (1931) (holding that a
Minnesota statute authorizing prior restraints on publication of any defamatory
materials was unconstitutional).
64. See Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940).
65. 283 U.S. at 716; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 726-27 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that even when national
security information is implicated, the government has the burden of proving
that disclosure would have severe consequences for national security).
66. See Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) (stating that a loy-
alty oath that ignored the element of scienter was invalid).
67. See Websites Shut Selves Down, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 2, 2000, at A8,
available at 2000 WL 8074750; Margie Wylie, Nader Backers Elect to Trade
Their Vote, THE PLAN DEALER, Nov. 1, 2000, at 2A, available at 2000 NVL
5173523.
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not in violation of any laws, you should not participate in vote-
swapping.,
68
Despite their support of Ralph Nader, and the questionable con-
stitutionality of the secretaries' actions, no vote-swapping Web site
operator was willing to risk prison or fines. At least three vote-
swapping sites closed down immediately after Jones's letter to
VoteSwap2000.org became public, citing the threatened litigation as
their reason for ceasing operations. 69 One Florida-based site, Presi-
dentGore.com, had been designed to specifically exclude Califor-
nians because its operator was uncertain of California's jurisdiction
over him.70 Without determining whether the actions of the secre-
taries of state were constitutional or not, it is not far-fetched to theo-
rize that their actions may have had a profound effect on the outcome
of the 2000 presidential election by creating a nationwide "chilling
effect" on the publication and use of vote-swapping Web sites.
71
C. What Were the Electoral Consequences of the Chilling Effect?
Had the 2000 election been decided by a greater margin, this
debate would still be of constitutional importance since the idea of
online vote swapping was crushed by the mere threat of prosecu-
tion.72 However, because the entire election was resolved by a razor-
thin margin in the state of Florida, it is easy to speculate that the
vote-swapping movement could have had a profound effect upon the
outcome of the 2000 election. In fact, as late as November 17, 2000,
pundits claimed "Nader Traders" could have tipped Florida toward
Al Gore.
73
68. ACLU Defends Voters, supra note 7.
69. See Oregon Warns Websites, supra note 11.
70. When the user filled out the vote-swap form, if "California" was entered
in the "state" field, the user received the following message: "As at least one
other site has had issues with CALIFORNIA law not permitting the swap of
their votes, we have disallowed submissions from California. I'm sorry for
this, but I don't want to get in trouble over this."
http://www.presidentgore.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2000).
71. See Harris, 'Nader Traders', supra note 47.
72. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (holding that a
statute defining "subversive activities" was unconstitutional due to the poten-
tial "chilling effect" on defendant's associational rights).
73. See Harris, 'Nader Traders', supra note 47.
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One vote-swapping site, Voteexchange2000.org, arranged 257
exchanges for Florida voters between October 26 and October 30,
2000, when it shut down due to fear of prosecution.74 Since the buzz
surrounding the vote-swapping phenomenon had just begun, it is
likely that the rate of votes being swapped would have increased un-
til election day. However, had the rate not changed, 2056 votes
probably would have been exchanged, by this one site, in Florida
alone.75 More votes for Al Gore in Florida would have given
twenty-five more electoral votes to Al Gore nationwide, and would
have changed the outcome of the 2000 presidential race. In fact, had
the sites continued to run, the entire boondoggle the country endured
for a month after the election may never have occurred. Alterna-
tively, had the sites been shut down immediately, the race may not
have been decided by such a close margin, and George NV. Bush may
have been able to claim victory on Tuesday, November 7, 2000, in-
stead of waiting until December.
The effect on the election is not based on hindsight alone. When
the 2000 presidential campaign entered its waning days, it was a
cliffhanger between Al Gore and George W. Bush. With less than a
week to go, no pundits could definitively predict who was truly in
the lead. With a total of 538 electoral votes up for grabs and 270
needed to win the presidency, as of October 30, 2000, Bush securely
held 202 electoral votes to Gore's 190, and 146 electoral votes were
too close to call.76 By November 3, CNN.com reported 224 electoral
votes for Bush, 181 for Gore, and 133 were too close to call.
7
Meanwhile, Reuters reported that Bush had 217 electoral votes, ei-
ther solid or leaning toward him, while Gore had 200, and 121 elec-
toral votes were too close to call!
8
74. See, e.g., James Rosen, Backers of Gore, Nader Make Deal; E-trades:
Green Voters in Close States 'Swap' Votes for Gore in Pro-Bush States, THE
NEWs TRmUNE OF TACoMA, Nov. 2,2000, at Al.
75. See id.
76. See Michael Griffin, An Electoral Elite Will Have Last Word; In a
Close Race, Florida and 12 Other States Likely Will Choose the Next Presi-
dent, According to an Orlando Sentinel Analysis, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct.
30, 2000, at Al.
77. See http://wv.cnn.com/interactiveallpolitics/0010/electoral.map/Map
1.html (Nov. 4,2000).
78. See Reuters, Bush With Slight Edge in Electoral College Count (Nov. 3,
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Furthermore, the candidacy of Ralph Nader, the Green Party
nominee for president, made all of this more interesting. The Greens
have never been much of a force in American politics, but they
promised to have a resounding influence over who would be elected
president in the year 2000. In Florida, the polls, as of November 3,
2000, showed Gore with 46% of the vote, Bush with 42% of the
vote, and Nader with 6% of the vote.79 With a margin of error of
plus or minus four percent, this made the race for Florida's all-
important twenty-five electoral votes quite uncertain.80 Pennsylva-
nia's twenty-three electoral votes were similarly precarious with 45%
of the population supporting Gore, 41% supporting Bush, and 8%
supporting Nader.8 1 Washington, formerly in the Gore column,
82
was in a dead toss-up on November 3, 2000, with Gore and Bush
each with 44% of the vote and Nader with 6% of the vote.83 Nation-
ally speaking, as of October 27, 2000, if Nader had not been running,
56% of his supporters said they would have voted for Gore, while
23% would have voted for Bush, and 21% would not have voted at
all.84 Given these numbers, had Nader not been in the race, Gore
would have had a firm lead in Florida, Pennsylvania, and Oregon,
one week before the election.
As the wind blew out of California and chilled vote-swapping
operations nationwide, the national race for electoral votes was tight
with Bush holding 217 likely votes, Gore holding 200, and 121 too
2000), at http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nmi/20001103/pl/campaignelectoal
dc 9.html.
79. These percentages are from a Zogby tracking poll, conducted October
31 to November 2, 2000 for REuTERs/MSNBC, surveying 659 likely Florida
voters with a margin of error of plus or minus 4%. A copy of this poll is on
file with the author.
80. See id.
81. These percentages are from a Zogby tracking poll, conducted October
31 to November 2, 2000 for the TOLEDO BLADE and the PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, surveying 603 likely Pennsylvania voters with a margin of error of
plus or minus 4%. A copy of this poll is on file with the author.
82. See Ronald Brownstein, Campaign 2000: Liberals Beat Drum For
Gore, Hope Nader Backers Listen, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000, at A 16.
83. These percentages are from a Zogby tracking poll, conducted October
31 to November 2, 2000 for REUTERS/MSNBC, that surveyed 508 likely
Washington voters with a margin of error of plus or minus 4.5%. A copy of
this poll is on file with the author.
84. See Ruppe & Dizikes, supra note 34.
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close to call.85 With the race as close as it was, even New Hamp-
shire's four electoral votes, traditionally forgotten the day after the
primary election,86 were still important enough that neither campaign
abandoned the state.87 On November 1, 2000, Bush held 45% of the
votes in New Hampshire, Gore held 40%, and Nader 5%.88
Given the closeness of the election at this point, the secretaries
of state should have foreseen the potential effect upon the election.
Did they act correctly? Had they not acted, would it have changed
the outcome of the election? Were the other forty-eight secretaries
of state delinquent in not acting similarly? Although any effect upon
the result of the election is mere speculation, at the time the secre-
taries of state acted-or did not act-such an effect was certainly
foreseeable. The resolution of the debate over the propriety of their
conduct could have great implications for future elections and the
concept of democracy in a new media society.
IV. STATE CONCERNS
In the end, federal constitutional law will have the final word
over whether vote swapping is a protected activity. However, it is
important to examine both Oregon's and California's election laws
and constitutions before beginning the federal constitutional analysis.
Both California's and Oregon's secretaries of state relied upon
their respective state election laws in a misguided manner. The
analysis of each state's law reveals how the statutes might be misin-
terpreted to prohibit the vote-swapping sites' operation. If the actions
of the vote-swap Web site operators are examined in light of the re-
spective state statutes, it can be shown that prosecution resulting in
conviction was unlikely.
Even if the plain language of the Oregon and California election
laws was held to encompass the vote-swap Web sites, it is extremely
85. See Reuters, supra note 78.
86. See Mike Recht, Close Presidential Race Pulls Small States Out of
Obscurity (Oct. 31, 2000), THE TELEGRAPH ONLINE, at http/iwww.
nashuatelegraph.com.
87. See id.
88. These percentages are from an American Research Group poll con-
ducted October 31 to November 1, 2000, surveying 600 likely Newv Hampshire
voters with a margin of error of plus or minus 4%. A copy of this poll is on
file with the author.
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unlikely that the convictions would be upheld in light of each state's
constitution. Both Oregon's 89 and California's90 constitutions have
been held to give greater protection to First Amendment concerns
than the Federal Constitution.
91
A. California
The letter threatening prosecution sent by Bill Jones, secretary
of state of California, to the vote-swapping Web sites, was doubly
flawed. First, under California constitutional law, his actions were
void. Second, his application of the statute was flawed under its
plain text.
1. California constitutional law
The California Constitution affords greater protection to free
speech and association than the Federal Constitution.92 As long as
federal rights are protected, California legal principles will prevail in
California state courts.
93
As of Monday, November 6, 2000, VoteSwap2000.org's federal
court motion for a temporary restraining order languished as the
rights of Californians and Americans nationwide suffered irreparable
harm due to the threatened prosecutions' creation of an "ominous,
chilling effect on the free exercise of political speech" and freedom
of association.
94
Upon receipt of the prosecution threats, counsel for
VoteSwap2000.org should have immediately sought injunctive relief
against the secretary of state in a California state court through a writ
of mandate. 95 This remedy is appropriate where denial of relief
89. See Deras v. Myers, 535 P.2d 541, 544 (Or. 1975).
90. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908, 592 P.2d
341, 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 859 (1979), affd 447 U.S. 74 (1980) ("Past deci-
sions on speech and private property testify to the strength of 'liberty of speech'
in this state.").
91. See infra Part VI.
92. See Robins, 23 Cal. 3d at 908, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
93. See id. at 907-10, 592 P.2d at 345-47, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858-60. For a
complete federal analysis of vote swapping, see infra Part VI.
94. Gonzales v. City of Santa Paula, 180 Cal. App. 3d 1116, 1121, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 164, 167 (1986).
95. See id. at 1121, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
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permits an immediate infringement on First Amendment rights.96
California courts have held that when prosecution creates an "omi-
nous, chilling effect on the free exercise of political speech... [a]
petition for writ of mandate [is] appropriate." 
7
Had such a writ petition been filed, it would have been appro-
priate under California law to grant it.98 However, it is not necessary
to reach the constitutional concerns under California law, since the
application of the statute was not in accord with the plain meaning of
the election law.
2. The plain language of the election law
The California secretary of state threatened to prosecute the op-
erators of VoteSwap2000.org99 for violations of California Elections
Code sections 18521(a)' and 18522(a)(2).10 1 These provisions pro-
hibit citizens from giving or receiving payment or other "valuable
consideration" in order to induce any voter to vote for a particular
96. See Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 244, 251, 690
P.2d 610, 613,208 Cal. Rptr. 137, 140 (1984).
97. Gonzales, 180 Cal. App. 3d at 1121, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 167 (citing Wil-
son v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 656, 532 P.2d 116, 119, 119 Cal. Rptr.
468, 471 (1975); Duran v. Cassidy, 28 Cal. App. 3d 574, 578-79, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 793, 796-97 (1972)).
98. See id. (citing Wilson, 13 Cal. 3d at 656, 532 P.2d at 119, 119 Cal. Rptr.
at 471; Duran, 28 Cal. App. 3d at 578-79, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 796-97).
99. Jones stated that VoteSwap2000.org "specifically offers to broker the
exchange of votes throughout the United States of America. This activity is
corruption of the voting process in violation of Elections Code sections 18521
and 18522 as well as Penal Code section 182, criminal conspiracy... any per-
son or entity that tries to exchange votes or broker the exchange of votes will
be pursued with utmost vigor." E-mail from Bill Jones, California secretary of
state, to operator of VoteSwap2000.org (Nov. 1, 2000) (on file with author).
100. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18521 (West 1996) ("A person shall not directly or
through any other person receive, agree, or contract for, before, during or after
an election, any money, gift, loan, or other valuable consideration.., because
he or any other person... [v]oted, agreed to vote, refrained from voting, or
agreed to refrain from voting for any particular person or measure.").
101. Id. § 18522(a)(2) ("Neither a person nor a controlled committee shall
directly or through any other person or controlled committee pay, lend, or
contribute, or offer or promise to pay, lend, or contribute, any money or other
valuable consideration to or for any voter or to or for any other person to ...
[i]nduce any voter to... [v]ote or refrain from voting at an election for any
particular person or measure.").
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person or measure. Jones believed that the exchange of promises to
vote for certain candidates fit the definition of "valuable considera-
tion." California law defines "valuable consideration" as follows:
Any benefit conferred, or agreed to be conferred, upon the
promisor, by any other person, to which the promisor is not
lawfully entitled, or any prejudice suffered, or agreed to be
suffered, by such person, other than such as he is at the time
of consent lawfully bound to suffer, as an inducement to the
promisor, is a good consideration for a promise.10 2
Valuable consideration is not necessarily money or a material
benefit. 103 Consideration exists if the person to whom the promise is
made, loses any right he could have otherwise exercised; or the per-
son making the promise, receives any benefit he would otherwise not
have had.' ° Both need not exist in order for there to be considera-
tion, but if neither condition is met, there is no consideration.1
05
If the promise leaves a party able to perform or withdraw at will
without detriment, there is no consideration and the contract is
void. 10 6 If even one of the promises given in an agreement leaves a
party with the option to perform or withdraw at will, then the prom-
ise is illusory and provides no consideration. 1
07
In comparison to "valuable consideration," "gratuitous consid-
eration" is defined as consideration that "is not founded upon any
such loss, injury, or inconvenience to the party to whom it moves as
to make it valid in law."' 0 8  Therefore, absent the elements of
102. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1605 (West 1982).
103. See Estate of Bishop, 209 Cal. App. 2d 48, 55, 25 Cal. Rptr. 763, 767
(1962).
104. See S. Cal. Enters. v. Walter & Co., 78 Cal. App. 2d 750, 758-60, 178
P.2d 785, 790-91 (1947); Chrisman v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 83 Cal. App. 249,
256, 256 P.2d 618, 621 (1927) (stating that if the promisor is not otherwise
lawfully entitled to the benefit, the benefit is sufficient to claim valuable con-
sideration); Parsons v. Cashman, 23 Cal. App. 298, 302, 137 P. 1109, 1110
(1913).
105. See Jordan v. Scott, 38 Cal. App. 739, 742, 177 P. 504, 505 (1918).
106. See Mattei v. Hopper, 51 Cal. 2d 119, 122, 124, 330 P.2d 625, 626-27
(1958); Cox v. Hollywood Film Enters., 109 Cal. App. 2d 320, 325, 240 P.2d
713, 716 (1952).
107. See Pease v. Brown, 186 Cal. App. 2d 425, 431, 8 Cal. Rptr. 917, 921
(1960).
108. BLAcK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 307 (6th ed. 1990).
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valuable consideration that make it truly valuable, the consideration
is merely gratuitous.
The right to vote is a right that both parties might otherwise ex-
ercise, as was the right to refrain from voting, or the right to vote for
whomever they pleased. The promises made did not change this
condition. When voter's agreed to swap their votes, they retained all
of these rights. Their pledge was unenforceable, and they were free
to withdraw at any time without detriment. Therefore, at best the
agreements could be deemed gratuitous consideration, that is consid-
eration that "is not founded upon any such loss, injury, or inconven-
ience to the party to whom it moves as to make it valid in law."' 1
As such, the acts of vote swappers were no more than exchanges of
mere gratuitous consideration, and the Web site operators were
working outside the scope of the statute.
B. Oregon
It is important to note that Oregon Secretary of State Bill Brad-
bury, a Democrat, took steps far greater than the Republican secre-
tary of state of California by targeting sites outside of Oregon."
0
However, under Oregon law, Bradbury equally overstepped the
boundaries of his state election statute and his state constitution.
1. Oregon election law
On November 2, 2000, Bradbury said online vote swapping,
even without the exchange of money, violated Oregon's election
laws. 1 1 Bradbury acted swiftly, and sent desist letters to six
109. Id.
110. This raises interesting questions as to whether he would even have been
able to assert jurisdiction over the operators. This issue is beyond the scope of
this Article, but there have been many excellent studies of this question. See,
e.g., Kevin R. Lyn, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Is a Home Page
Enough to Satisfy Minimum Contacts?, 22 CAMPBELL L. REv. 341 (2000);
Brian E. Daughdrill, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Wait-
ing For the Other Shoe to Drop on First Amendment Concerns, 51 MERCER L.
REV. 919 (2000); Todd D. Leitstein, Comment, A Solution For Personal Juris-
diction on the Internet, 59 LA. L. REV. 565 (1999).
111. See Oregon Warns Websites that Promote Vote Trading, supra note 11;
see also OR. REV. STAT. § 260.665 (2)(h) (1999) (listing illegal acts that con-
stitute undue influence on registering and voting).
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vote-trading sites, all based outside Oregon. 12 Although Oregon
initially targeted sites that merely advocated vote swapping, by No-
vember 3, 2000, the Oregon Elections Board softened its position to
prohibit only the entering into a contract to trade votes or facilitate
such activity. 113 Sites that merely advocated vote swapping were no
longer targeted.
Oregon's voting corruption law states that "[n]o person, acting
either alone or with or through any other person, shall directly or in-
directly subject any person to undue influence with the intent to in-
duce any person to [r]egister or vote in any particular manner." 114
The statute defines "undue influence" as including the "giving or
promising to give money, employment or other thing of value."' 5
The Oregon secretary of state interpreted "thing of value" to in-
clude the exchange of a co-equal vote from another voter. Therefore,
according to the State Election Division, any individual pair of voters
engaging in an arrangement to swap votes is in violation of Oregon
law," 6 as is any Web site operator who facilitates such an arrange-
ment.
Analysis of this concept under Oregon law hinges on this ques-
tion: Is a vote a "thing of value" that would be used to induce a per-
son to vote? There is only one reported case in Oregon interpreting
Oregon Revised Statute section 260.665 ("section 260.665"). Al-
though it almost offers a perfect roadmap to analysis of this issue un-
der Oregon law, due to a procedural technicality it offers little in the
way of precedent upon which a court, the secretary of state, or citi-
zens can rely.
112. See Harris, ACLU Takes Up Vote, supra note 12.
113. See Press Release, Oregon Secretary of State (Nov. 3, 2000) (on file
with author).
114. OR. REV. STAT. § 260.665(2)(c) (1999).
115. Id. § 260.665(1).
116. See Interview with Jennifer Hertel, Program Representative, Oregon
State Election Division (Nov. 6, 2000) (confirmed by e-mail from Norma
Buckno, Oregon State Election Division, to Marc J. Randazza (Mar. 28, 2001)
(on file with author)). Hertel stated that the individual voters would be in vio-
lation of Oregon Revised Statute section 260.665, but acknowledged that there
would be no practical way to prosecute individual voters due to the impossi-
bility of verifying exactly how each voter cast his or her ballot. See id.
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Oregon Republican Party v. State'"7 dealt with a plan by the
Oregon Republican Party to mail absentee ballot applications with
the voter's name preprinted on them; a letter urging the voter to apply
for an absentee ballot if the voter was unsure of being able to vote on
election day; and a postage-paid envelope in which the voter could
send the application to Republican Party headquarters.'"8 The party
would have then forwarded the applications to the county clerk, who
would send the ballots to the individual voters."1 9 The Republican
Party sought a declaration that the mailing would not violate the
election statute.120 The Circuit Court of Marion County, Oregon,
held that the plan would violate the statute because the stamped en-
velope was a "thing of value."'1'
The Republican Party appealed, and the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals reversed the circuit court's finding and agreed that such a
mailing would not violate section 260.665.12 The court opined that
by asking "whether [a] postage paid envelope is a thing of value that
would be used to induce a person to vote," the parties had incorrectly
focused on the first part of the question.1 3 The decisive factor was
not whether the stamped envelope was valuable consideration, but
rather whether there existed intent to induce persons to register or
vote. 124 Since inducement requires a "promise of an advantage as a
result of performing the desired act; it is persuasion coupled with a
benefit or the absence of a threatened detriment."'12 Therefore, in
order for inducement to exist, there must be a benefit greater than
"what is involved in the act of voting," something with "independent
value to the voter."'26 The court held that the envelope was indeed a
"thing of value" but that it did not reward the act of voting. 2 7
117. 717 P.2d 1206 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) [hereinafter Oregon Republican 1].
118. Seeid. at 1207.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 1208.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 1209.
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This decision would appear to quell the vote-swap controversy,
at least in the state of Oregon. However, the Oregon Supreme Court
rendered Oregon Republican I moot on appeal, because the election
was over.128 While not accepting that the doctrine of "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" existed in Oregon, the Supreme Court
of Oregon stated that if it did, it would not be applicable to this
case.' 29 Since the Republican Party did not allege that it intended to
utilize the same plan in the future, the issue evaded review. 3 There-
fore, the decision of the court of appeals in Oregon Republican I was
reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal as
moot.3 ,
On remand, the court of appeals once again dismissed the deci-
sion as moot. 32 However, Justice Van Hoomissen did not go so qui-
etly. In a scathing concurrence, Van Hoomissen foresaw the vote-
swap controversy and wrote:
The Supreme Court could have decided the issue on its
merits and should have done so. Meanwhile, political par-
ties, campaign committees, candidates and public officials
responsible for the enforcement of the election laws are left
guessing about the legality of the conduct proposed here.
More litigation, more expense and more delay are the only
results of the Supreme Court's directive to this court.
133
128. See Or. Republican Party v. State, 722 P.2d 1237, 1237 (Or. 1986)
[hereinafter Oregon Republican 11]; see also Brumnett v. Psychiatric Sec. Re-
view Bd., 848 P.2d 1194, 1196 (Or. 1993) ("Cases that are otherwise justici-
able, but in which a court's decision no longer will have a practical effect on or
concerning the rights of the parties... [are] moot.").
129. Id.; see also Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 895 P.2d 765, 774-75 (Or. 1995)
("[C]apable of repetition, yet evading review" has been rejected by Oregon
courts.); Pham v. Thompson, 965 P.2d 482, 485 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (Oregon
does not recognize the doctrine of "capable of repetition, yet evading re-
view."); Safeway Inc. v. Or. Pub. Employees Union, 954 P.2d 196, 198 (Or.
Ct. App. 1998).
130. See Oregon Republican 11, 722 P.2d at 1238. But see, e.g., Responsible
Pub. Contracting Council, Inc. v. Oregon, 956 P.2d 993, 994-95 (Or. Ct. App.
1998) ("[M]atters of public interest should be resolved by this court, even in
the face of apparent mootness of the particular case at hand.").
131. See Oregon Republican II, 722 P.2d at 1238-39.
132. Or. Republican Party v. Oregon, 726 P.2d 412, 412 (Or. Ct. App. 1986)
[hereinafter Oregon Republican 111].
133. Id. (Van Hoomissen, J., concurring).
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2. Oregon constitutional analysis
Van Hoomissen not only foresaw the issue before Oregon courts
today, but offered in his concurrence in Oregon Republican I guid-
ance to the resolution of this issue on free speech grounds. In ex-
amining the legislative intent behind section 260.665, Van Hoomis-
sen wrote: "an election offense does not exist unless the act tends to
produce the types of evils that the statute was designed to avoid."'134
Van Hoomissen's concurrence states that the giving of a thing of
value does not include the giving of an item or service that does no
more than facilitate the act of deliberative voting.13
5
Van Hoomissen noted that the court did not address the consti-
tutional aspects of the case that he believed were present, and sug-
gested that the application of section 260.665, in this manner, was
violative of Article I, Section 8136 and Article I, Section 26137 of the
Oregon Constitution.1 38 He also opined that the statute might violate
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution but, if
either the freedom of speech or freedom of assembly articles of the
state constitution are violated, analysis under the Federal Constitu-
tion is not necessary.1 39 In some circumstances, the Oregon Consti-
tution provides greater protection than the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.1 40 The state and federal constitutions are consid-
ered equivalent enough so that Oregon courts will usually rely on
federal cases interpreting the First Amendment, even while inter-
preting the state constitution.
141
134. Oregon Republican I, 717 P.2d at 1209-10.
135. See id. at 1210.
136. OR. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("No law shall be passed restraining the free ex-
pression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on
any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for abuse of this
right.").
137. OR. CONST. art. I, § 26 ("No law shall be passed restraining any of the
inhabitants of the state from assembling together in a peaceable manner to con-
suit for their common good; nor from instructing their representatives; nor
from applying to the legislature for redress of grievances.").
138. See Oregon Republican I, 717 P.2d at 1209.
139. See Deras v. Myers, 535 P.2d 541, 549 (Or. 1975).
140. See id. at 541.
141. See, e.g., State v. Crane, 612 P.2d 735 (Or. Ct. App. 1980). For a com-
plete analysis of vote swapping under the Federal Constitution, see infra Part
VI
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Bradbury's application of section 260.665 impacted First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly. The Web
sites expressed political opinion and facilitated the assembly of citi-
zens to achieve a common political goal. As such, the application of
the statute must be subjected to strict scrutiny under the state consti-
tution. 
142
Initially, Bradbury's actions implicated both Article I, Section 8
and Article I, Section 26 of the Oregon Constitution. However,
given his re-statement of position on November 3, 2000, only Sec-
tion 26, the Oregon Constitution's guarantee of freedom of associa-
tion, was implicated. 43 This provision states, in pertinent part: "No
law shall be passed restraining any of the inhabitants of the state
from assembling together in a peaceable manner to consult for their
common good .... ",144
Therefore, the constitutional question becomes whether, under
Oregon law, an unqualified constitutional prohibition against laws
suppressing freedom of association can be overridden by the actions
of a secretary of state, which directly restrain freedom of associa-
tion.' 45 This is a logical proposition that the Supreme Court of Ore-
gon has already rejected.' 46 If the secretary of state threatened citi-
zens with prosecution that results in a restraint of Oregonians from
assembling together to consult for their own common good, no bal-
ancing test is necessary or proper. 147
Had a lawsuit been brought in Oregon court, it would have been
proper for the court to enjoin the secretary of state from further
threats or prosecution. At this point, any citizen who intends to en-
gage in this type of conduct in an upcoming election, may have
standing to file suit in Oregon and would, based on the logic in the
Oregon Republican Party trilogy of cases, stand an excellent chance
of prevailing.
142. See State v. Hodges, 457 P.2d 491, 492-93 (Or. 1969); State v. Tusek,
630 P.2d 892, 894 (Or. Ct. App. 1981); Crane, 612 P.2d at 737-38.
143. See Press Release, supra note 113.
144. OR. CONST. art. I, § 26.
145. See Deras, 535 P.2d at 544.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 545-46 n.6.
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V. FEDERAL ELECTION LAW--42 U.S.C. § 1973I(c)
The federal law that parallels the state laws invoked by Oregon
and California is the federal vote-buying statute, 42 U.S.C. §
1973i(c). This law prohibits conspiring "with another individual for
the purpose of encouraging his false registration to vote or illegal
voting, or pay or offers to pay or accepts payment either for registra-
tion to vote or voting.... ,,148 Amidst a backdrop of action by state
officials, the U.S. Justice Department failed to move against any of
the vote-swapping Web site operators. A spokesperson at the De-
partment was quoted as saying that since the sites "serve[d] as a
clearing house... [t]here [was] no pecuniary exchange, and it [was]
an agreement amongst private parties," thus, there was no violation
in terms of voter fraud.'
49
An examination of the case law interpreting 42 U.S.C. §
1973i(c) suggests that this analysis was correct. It is clearly a viola-
tion of the statute to pay for a vote or even to register to vote,
whether the voter is paid $50,150 $3,151 or $1.152 Furthermore, it is
not necessary for the government to prove that vote-buying schemes
actually had an effect upon a federal election.153 All that is necessary
to establish a violation of § 1973i(c) is evidence that a defendant
bought or offered to buy a vote and that such activity exposed the
federal elements of the election to the mere possibility of corrup-
tion.1 54 For "corruption" to exist, there must be at least an offer of
pecuniary gain to the voter. 55 Whether the actual corruption takes
place or whether the participants in the scheme intended that it take
place is irrelevant.
56
148. 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c) (1994).
149. Napoli, supra note 5.
150. See United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 782, 789 (8th Cir. 1988).
151. See United States v. Daugherty, 952 F.2d 969, 969 (8th Cir. 1991).
152. See United States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1972).
153. See United States v. Carmichael, 685 F.2d 903, 908-09 (4th Cir. 1982).
154. See id. at 908.
155. See United States v. Garcia, 719 F.2d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating
that the intent of Congress was to prohibit the exchange of items of pecuniary
value for individual votes).
156. See United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003, 1011 (5th Cir. 1981).
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The definition of "payment" in § 1973i(c) is not necessarily
limited to the transfer of money or a monetary equivalent. 157 The
legislative history of the Act makes it clear that it contemplated an
exchange of a benefit beyond that of actual cash. 158 The Congres-
sional Record shows that nonmonetary payments fell within the defi-
nition of "payment."159 However, one court held that this definition
does not extend beyond the receipt of benefits of a pecuniary na-
ture. 16 Benefits, such as the assistance of a civic group to prospec-
tive voters or a continuance of employee's fringe benefits, are not
prohibited by the statute. 161
Although most of the limited case law interpreting the Act indi-
cates that vote swapping would not be illegal under § 1973i(c), its
approval is not unquestionable. It could be argued that agreeing to
exchange a vote for a vote is tantamount to exchanging a vote for a
governmental benefit (a vote) to which the voter is already entitled.
In United States v. Garcia, voters received welfare vouchers in ex-
change for their votes. 162 In that case, the Fifth Circuit found that
although the recipients were already eligible for this government
benefit, and thus were not receiving anything they were not other-
wise entitled to, the receipt of the vouchers still amounted to a pecu-
niary benefit since the vouchers came in specific dollar denomina-
tions and could be directly exchanged for goods as if they were
cash. 163 The court further recognized that the voters stated that they
believed that receipt of the vouchers depended upon how they agreed
to vote, and not upon their eligibility.1
64
157. See Garcia, 719 F.2d at 101.
158. See 111 CONG. REC. S8423 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1965) (statement of Sen.
Williams) ("Third, the amendment would provide a penalty for anyone offer-
ing or accepting money or something of value in exchange for registering or
voting." (emphasis added)).
159. See 111 CONG. REc. 58986 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1965) (statement of Sen.
Williams) ("I wish to make it as clear as it is possible to make it that it is in-
tended solely to prohibit the practice of offering or accepting money or a fifth
of liquor, or something - some payment of some kind - for voting or register-
ing.").
160. See Garcia, 719 F.2d at 102.
161. See Lewin, 467 F.2d at 1136.
162. See Garcia, 719 F.2d at 100.
163. See id. at 100-01.
164. See id. at 100.
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Although applying the Garcia analysis would be difficult, a
zealous prosecutor could take action against a vote-swapping site by
relying upon this logic. If this issue arises again, and the party in
power does not stand to benefit, as it did in the 2000 presidential
election, federal response to the vote-swapping Web sites could be
entirely different.
VI. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
The acts of the secretaries of state of Oregon and California
touched upon the core of constitutionally protected necessities for
democracy-the trinity of speech, assembly, and association.
Freedom of speech is a necessary element in a self-governing
society.165 The constitutional guarantee that speech shall remain un-
encumbered by governmental intervention exists to ensure the free
exchange of ideas for the promotion of political and social change.1
66
When speech involves political issues, the U. S. Supreme Court has
consistently recognized it as at the core of First Amendment val-
ues. 167 Even jurists who would protect only a narrow sliver of what
is now untouchable agree that political speech must be protected. 168
Freedom of association does not have the explicit textual pro-
tection of the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has long rec-
ognized it as a member of the First Amendment family of free-
doms. 169 The rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association
165. See generally MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 13.
166. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13, 14 (1976).
167. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1988) (stating that the
First Amendment protects political speech outside foreign embassies); cf. Con-
nick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145-46 (1983) (stating that when a public em-
ployee speaks, not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as
an employee on matters only of personal interest, federal courts will not nor-
mally protect the employee's speech).
168. See Bork, supra note 13, at 23 ("[E]ven without a first amendment...
representative democracy... would be meaningless without freedom to dis-
cuss government and its policies. Freedom for political speech could and
should be inferred even if there were no first amendment.").
169. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)
("Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court
has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the
freedoms of speech and assembly. It is beyond debate that freedom to engage
in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect
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are deeply intertwined, 170 for, like the right to free speech, the right
to assemble in furtherance of a common political goal is fundamental
to our system of government and law.17 1 Advocacy of a political
point of view, protected by the First Amendment, "is undeniably en-
hanced by group association."' 72 The Constitution not only protects
the freedom of citizens to join together to discuss and further their
common political beliefs, 173 but affirmatively demands it. 174 There-
fore, the right to associate for the advancement of political beliefs is
"an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of
speech."
175
The argument could be made that the Framers intended to ex-
tend freedom of expression and association only to technologies
of 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which embraces freedom of speech.") (citing Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S.
313, 321 (1958); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
324 (1937); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)).
170. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460-61; Thomas, 323 U.S. at 530 (holding
that the right to associate in order to express one's views is "inseparable" from
the right to speak freely); De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 364 ("The right of peaceable
assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally
fundamental.").
171. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402, 2408 (2000)
(stating that members of a political party have the right to select their nominees
for higher office, thus California's blanket primary did not hold up under strict
scrutiny); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 336 n.1 (1995)
(stating that the right of assembly is a fundamental right); First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779-80 (1978) (finding that freedom of as-
sembly is a fundamental right embedded in our law).
172. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460; Thomas, 323 U.S. at 530; De Jonge, 299
U.S. at 364.
173. See Cal. Democratic Party, 120 S. Ct. at 2408; Tashjian v. Republican
Party, 479 U.S. 208, 214-15 (1986) (holding that state law mandating that only
party members, and not independents, may vote in party primaries placed an
unconstitutional burden on the fundamental freedom of political association
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution).
174. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 13, at 17-19.
175. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460 (citing Staub, 355 U.S. at 321; Thomas, 323
U.S. at 530; Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303; Palko, 302 U.S. at 324; De Jonge, 299
U.S. at 364; Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666).
1324
ONLINE VOTE SWAPPING
existing in the 1700s, 176 but even strict textualists urge that courts
must apply constitutional values to new circumstances, especially
when those circumstances arise due to changes in technology.
77
Cyberspace is entitled to no less protection than other traditional
public forums and media. 78 Therefore, online assembly, association,
and speech for the furtherance of a public political goal are at the
core of First Amendment values. 1
79
A. Regulation of Vote-Swap Sites Requires Strict Scrutiny
Political speech is most jealously guarded as the core value
protected by the First Amendment, 80 "[ffor speech concerning
176. See Corn-Revere, supra note 2, at 265.
177. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (stating that the First Amendment must be interpreted "to encom-
pass the electronic media").
178. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) ("As a matter of consti-
tutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that
governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere
with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it."); cf Brief for Plaintiffs at
7, Porter v. Jones (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-11700) (arguing that the Supreme
Court has explicitly rejected the argument that cyberspace is subject to less
protection than newspapers).
179. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (stating that the First
Amendment protects political speech outside foreign embassies); NAACP v.
Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982) (finding that members of
an organization organized for lawful political motives may not be punished for
association with other members who may act unlawfully); cf Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (stating that when a public employee speaks,
not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee
upon matters only of personal interest, federal courts will not normally protect
the employee's speech).
180. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) ("Whatever differ-
ences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practi-
cally universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes
discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in
which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters re-
lating to political processes."); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964) (stating that the First Amendment demands unfettered and uninhibited
robust political debate); Bork, supra note 13, at 23 ("[E]ven without a first
amendment... representative democracy... would be meaningless without
freedom to discuss government and its policies. Freedom for political speech
could and should be inferred even if there were no first amendment."); Cass R.
Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. C. L. REV. 255, 305-06 (1992) ("[A]n in-
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public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government."' 81 At the very pinnacle of this core value is the notion
that speech related to a campaign for political office is worthy of the
"fullest and most urgent application" of First Amendment protec-
tion.
18 2
Even the most fundamental of constitutional rights may be cur-
tailed if the infringement passes the test of strict scrutiny. 8 3 Speech,
assembly, and associational rights may be infringed only by regula-
tions that are designed to serve a compelling governmental interest;
are unrelated to the suppression of ideas; and are narrowly tailored to
achieve the stated interest.'
8 4
sistence that government's burden is greatest when political speech is at issue
responds well to the fact that here government is most likely to be biased. The
presumption of distrust of government is strongest when politics are at issue.").
181. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); Whitney v. Califor-
nia, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[The Founding Fa-
thers] believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without
free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discus-
sion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of nox-
ious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that pub-
lic discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government.").
182. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992) (citing Eu v. S.F. County
Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971))).
183. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 211 (holding that the prohibition of the solici-
tation of votes and distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the
polls is permissible); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)
(stating that the compelling governmental interest in maintaining armed forces
in time of war justifies the suppression of the speech element of the expressive
political conduct of burning a draft card); cf Mills, 384 U.S. at 219 (explaining
that the law prohibiting the publication of political editorials on an election day
is an "obvious and flagrant" violation of the principles of the First Amend-
ment).
184. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 879 (2000)
(articulating the strict scrutiny test); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v.
FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (same); Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for
Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 572-73 (1987); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. &
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (stating that the freedom of association is a funda-
mental element of personal liberty which may be curtailed if the restriction
passes strict scrutiny); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Sanitation
& Recycling Indus. v. City of N.Y., 107 F.3d 985, 997 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Even
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The application of strict scrutiny hinges on whether the restric-
tion severely burdens speech'8 5 or associational rights. 186 If so, then
strict scrutiny applies. 8 7 However, most cases eliminate this step
and simply state that if political speech or association is at issue, then
strict scrutiny applies without examining the degree of burden cre-
ated by the restriction. 88 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson held
that it is of no consequence whether the goals sought to be furthered
by the association are political, economic, religious, or cultural-any
government action to curtail them is subject to the most exacting
level of constitutional scrutiny. 189
Strict scrutiny has been applied to the solicitation of voters and
distribution of literature within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling
place, 190 regulation of campaign promises, 19 1 and a law prohibiting
businesses from making expenditures to influence the outcome of
referenda. 192  If associational rights of a political group are
regulations that substantially infinge upon [the right of expressive association]
will pass constitutional muster if they serve compelling government interests
unrelated to the suppression of ideas and those interests cannot be achieved
through less restrictive means.").
185. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 208
(1999) ("[R]estrictions on core political speech so plainly impose a 'severe
burden."'); Eu, 489 U.S. at 222-23; see also LA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Vic-
tims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
186. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (stating that the right to speak can not be
protected from government interference without a correlative freedom to asso-
ciate); see also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61
(1958).
187. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 225.
188. See Buckley, 525 U.S. at 207-08 ("When core political speech is at is-
sue, we have ordinarily applied strict scrutiny without first determining that the
State's law severely burdens speech."); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) ("When a law burdens core political speech, we ap-
ply 'exacting scrutiny' .... ).
189. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460-61 ("[S]tate action which may have the
effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.").
190. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 193.
191. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982) (holding that the state
has a legitimate interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral process, but
when it seeks to do so by restricting speech, strict scrutiny is triggered).
192. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767,786 (1978).
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implicated, strict scrutiny must apply. 93  Given that the users of
vote-swapping sites were communicating and associating for purely
political reasons, strict scrutiny must apply.
The actions of Oregon and California in restricting the vote-
swap Web site operators' rights to disseminate information of a po-
litical nature on the eve of a pending election implicated core First
Amendment values to such an extent that strict scrutiny must apply.
If this were not enough, the fact that associational rights of users and
potential users of these sites were impacted independently triggers
strict scrutiny. Given the fact that both are implicated, no other re-
sult would be logical.
B. Were the Restrictions by the Secretaries of State
Content-Neutral?
The actions of Oregon and California regulated protected politi-
cal speech and association in a public forum. In many cases, this
was enough to trigger strict scrutiny. 194 However, it is necessary to
determine whether the actions by the secretaries of state were con-
tent-neutral or content-based in order to precisely determine the ap-
propriate level of scrutiny under which their actions should be ex-
amined. '95
Regulations that distinguish permissible speech from impermis-
sible speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content-
based. 96 Above any other principle in First Amendment law, when
the government acts in a manner to restrict speech due to its
193. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214-15
(1986) (explaining that the burdens on the associational rights of a political
party must be subjected to strict scrutiny); see also Buckley, 525 U.S. at 212;
Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992) (burdening association by lim-
iting new parties' access to the ballot is subject to strict scrutiny); Eu, 489 U.S.
at 224-25 (noting that laws that restrict a political party's right to endorse can-
didates is subject to strict scrutiny); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 728-29
(1974) (holding that restrictions that limit a candidate's right to political asso-
ciation are subject to strict scrutiny).
194. See Buckley, 525 U.S. at 207-08; McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
514 U.S. 334, 345-47 (1995); Eu, 489 U.S. at 222-24 (1989).
195. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
196. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992) ("Whether indi-
viduals may exercise their free speech rights near polling places depends en-
tirely on whether their speech is related to a political campaign.").
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message, ideas, subject matter, or content, its actions are presumed to
be invalid. 197 In fact, "[i]t is rare that a regulation restricting speech
because of its content will ever be permissible."'198 This is because
when the government restricts speech due to the message it conveys,
it attacks the very heart of the First Amendment. 199 Restrictions
based on the message conveyed impede society's search for truth, 00
impair the individual's right to meaningful self-fulfillment,20 1 and-
most applicable to the vote-swapping controversy-obstruct the
ability of the citizens to fully participate in a system of deliberative
self-government. 0 2
197. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Police Dep't
of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression be-
cause of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."); see also
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (stating that the general rule is that
government may not proscribe the content of individual expression); Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (stating that it is firmly established that
ideas may not be prohibited merely because they are offensive); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("[D]ebate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open .... "); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.");
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963) (holding that the Constitution
protects speech without regard to the beliefs offered); Wood v. Georgia, 370
U.S. 375, 388-89 (1962) ("Under our system of government, counterargument
and education are the weapons available to expose these matters, not abridg-
ment of the rights of free speech and assembly."); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 4 (1949) ("The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society
depends on free discussion."); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65
(1937) ("[L]egislative intervention can find constitutional justification only by
dealing with the abuse. The rights themselves must not be curtailed.").
198. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000).
199. For a complete discussion of content-neutral analysis, see Geoffrey tR
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 46 (1987).
200. See id. at 56 n.42 (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is 'the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."')).
201. See id. at 56 n.44 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[inn our constitutional system, the protec-
tion of free expression is designed to enhance personal growth, self-realization,
and the development of individual autonomy.")).
202. See id. at 56 n.43 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791
(1978) ("[I]n a self-governing nation, the people, not the government, 'are en-
trusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of
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Laws that impair speech with a blind eye toward the ideas and
views expressed are usually content-neutral.2 °3 The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that when government wishes to restrict all speech
coming out of a sound-amplification truck regardless of the message
broadcast, this is a permissible regulation.204 Similarly, the Court
found permissible a law that prohibited the use of billboards to
minimize visual clutter and to enhance aesthetics,20 5 and a National
Park Service anti-camping rule that applied to traditional campers, as
well as people seeking to sleep on the national mall as a part of a co-
ordinated political statement.206 All of these regulations impacted
speech, including potentially political speech. No regulations, how-
ever, were created for the purpose of impairing speech based on its
message.2 °7
According to counsel for some of the Web site operators, the
threat of prosecution turned on the particular message the sites car-
ried-the "user's willingness to participate in an exchange of unen-
forceable pledges as a methodology for communicating a political
viewpoint., 20 8 Web sites that contained any other content were not
subject to threats of reprisal by the government.
20 9
The Republican National Committee had a contemporaneous
Web site, which permitted users to enter their name, address, e-mail
conflicting arguments.")).
203. See, e.g., Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 803 (holding that a city re-
quirement that concerts use city sound equipment and technicians is valid un-
der the First Amendment as a time, place, and manner regulation); City Coun-
cil v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (holding that
prohibition on posting of signs on lampposts did not address the content of the
signs); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
649 (1981) (holding that regulation requiring that organizations sell and solicit
funds only from designated kiosks was an even-handed rule applying to all
potential participants).
204. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949).
205. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-09 (1981).
206. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 292-93
(1984).
207. Facially even-handed regulations on speech are not always content-
neutral. See, e.g., Button, 371 U.S. at 423, 444 (holding that a Virginia law
prohibiting attorneys from accepting business from anyone who was not a
party to a suit or that had no pecuniary interest in the case impermissibly pre-
vented NAACP's political action).




address, and other personal information so that they could "Get in-
volved with the Republican Party!, 2 10  The Democratic National
Committee had a similar Web site inviting visitors to sign up and
"Take Action!",211 The Libertarians, 212 Natural Law Party,2 13 and the
Yahoo! personals214 all had Web forms permitting users to enter their
names into a database in order to communicate with other individuals
with common political or social goals. The one goal that the secre-
taries of state considered illegitimate was the common goal of si-
multaneously electing Al Gore as president and helping the Green
Party acquire five percent of the popular vote. As such, this does not
appear to be a content-neutral regulation, but one that specifically
targets the political goals of the so-called "Nader traders." Inasmuch
as they restricted Web sites that urged people to vote in a particular
manner in a publicly held election, the actions of the secretaries of
state are presumed to be unconstitutional.21 5
C. Did the Regulations Seek to Achieve a Compelling Governmental
Interest?
Under strict scrutiny, a regulation must be narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling governmental interest.21 6 Although the First
Amendment may be to some the most sacrosanct of rights, there are
competing government interests to which the First Amendment must
occasionally yield.217 Fair trial rights have been held to trump the
210. Republican National Committee, Get Involved With the Republican
Party!, at http://www.mc.org(RNCWeb/action.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2001).
211. Democratic National Committee, Take Action!, at http://www.
democrats.org/action/takeaction.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2001).
212. See Libertarian Party, Get Involved!, at httpJIwww.lp.orglaction/e-
mail.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2001).
213. See A Natural Law Party, Participation Sign Up Form, at
http://vww.natural-law.org/get_involved.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2001).
214. See Yahoo! Personals, at http://personals.yahoo.com (last visited Feb.
22, 2001).
215. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,219 (1966).
216. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 528 U.S. 803, 879
(2000); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
217. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507-08 (1951); Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666-67 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 51-52 (1919).
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First Amendment in specific circumstances.218  The need for the
government to keep order outside an abortion clinic may stand above
the rights of abortion protesters to spread their political message.
219
And in circumstances most analogous to the issue at hand, in order to
assure the public a right to "fair and honest" elections, First Amend-
ment rights are frequently trumped.220 The right to cast a ballot in an
uncorrupt election is just as important as the right to discuss that
election.
221
There would be little value in a wide-open debate prior to an
election, when the democratic process itself could be subverted by
intimidation and fraud. "[S]tate[s] ha[ve] a legitimate interest in up-
holding the integrity of the electoral process itself.,222 The preven-
tion of corruption-or even the appearance of corruption-in gov-
ernment has been held to be a compelling governmental interest
validating the restriction of constitutionally protected speech and as-
sociational rights.22 3 Therefore, the prohibition of the giving of gifts
or money to voters in exchange for their support was permissible.
224
The interest alleged by both secretaries of state was the elimina-
tion of "undue influence, 225 or "corruption, 226 from the voting
218. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350-51 (1966) (holding
that the First Amendment yields to fair trial rights).
219. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 382 (1997).
220. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402-05 (2000)
(stating that campaign contributions, although protected, yield to the mainte-
nance of the appearance of uncorrupt elections); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S.
191, 206 (1992) (maintaining a polling environment free from intimidation
trumps free speech); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982) (stating that
the integrity of the electoral process trumps free speech); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1976) (stating that campaign contribution limits are to pre-
vent appearance of corruption).
221. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 207; Brown, 456 U.S. at 52 (holding that the
state has a legitimate interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral process,
but when it seeks to do so by restricting speech, strict scrutiny is triggered).
222. Brown, 456 U.S. at 52.
223. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45 (stating that the restriction of campaign
contributions was justified by the need to prevent actual or apparent quid pro
quo corruption in the electoral process).
224. See Brown, 456 U.S. at 54 ("No body politic worthy of being called a
democracy entrusts the selection of leaders to a process of auction or barter.").
225. Letter from Bill Bradbury to Web site operators (Nov. 2, 2000) (on file
with author).
226. E-mail from California secretary of state to operator of Vote Swap 2000
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process in their respective states. These interests are certainly well
within the boundaries of what the law defines as a compelling state
interest.227 Given this fact, Oregon and California would have little
difficulty arguing that they were motivated to act by a desire to fur-
ther a compelling state interest when they restricted the speech and
associational fights of the Web site operators and users. However, it
does not appear that their actions bore a reasonable relationship to
the compelling governmental interest. Therefore, if vote swapping is
actually "bartering" of votes, it may be conduct that the state can le-
gitimately prohibit.228 As demonstrated above, nothing in this ar-
rangement was truly bartered. Voters discussed and convinced one
another to vote a certain way based on common political goals. The
Court drew a distinction between an exchange of this type and an il-
legal exchange by distinguishing between voting based on a promise
of public political action and voting based on an illegal exchange for
"private profit."
229
There could be no determination, or even serious assertion, that
anyone entered into a vote-swapping arrangement for private profit
or any other form of enrichment. Perhaps if the vote-swapping sites
had been more correctly named "vote consensus" sites or "vote stra-
tegically" sites, they would have passed by unnoticed. The fact is
that the only barter in this situation exists as a matter of semantic
misfortune. The vote swaps were unenforceable, conferred no bene-
fit upon either voter, and did not transfer anyone's voting author-
ity.23° These Web sites and their users engaged in political speech
and association-the absolute core of the First Amendment.23
(Nov. 1, 2000) (on file with author).
227. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45 (holding that the restriction of campaign
contributions is justified by the need to prevent actual or apparent quid pro quo
corruption in the electoral process).
228. See Brown, 456 U.S. at 54.
229. See id. at 55 (holding that a solicitation to enter into an agreement to
vote for pecuniary gain is an illegal exchange due to its relationship to private
profit).
230. Brief for Plaintiffs at 5, Porter v. Jones (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-11700)
(quoting Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1338-48
(2000)).
231. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2457 (2000) (citing
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
("[The Founding Fathers] believed that freedom to think as you will and to
;peak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of po-
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D. Were the Regulations the Least Restrictive Method of Serving the
Governmental Interest?
If the compelling governmental interest is the integrity of the
polling process, then the state may suppress fundamental rights to
achieve this interest.232 However, even the most compelling gov-
ernmental interest may not be promoted by broad means which sup-
press otherwise protected freedoms. 233 The danger of governmental
excess and censorship of politically disfavored ideas requires that
content-based restrictions be employed only when absolutely neces-
sary to achieve the interest asserted.234
The prohibition of vote-swapping Web sites in order to prevent
corruption in the political process was misguided. Both secretaries
of state relied upon statutes prohibiting the exertion of undue influ-
ence on a voter. Certainly, if these agreements were enforceable in
some manner, then the voters who entered into them would enter the
polls subject to the external influence of an enforceable contract pre-
venting them from voting according to their own political beliefs.
Even content-based restrictions on political speech in a public forum
would be permissible if this were the case.235
However, the agreements were in no manner binding or en-
forceable. Upon entering the voting booths, citizens were bound
only by their consciences and the desire to further their own interests.
There can be no valid determination that any vote swapper entered
the voting booth compelled to vote by any motivation but the
achievement of their own individual political goals.
While the threat of prosecution placed a great burden on provid-
ers of protected content, it did not effectively address the harm it
sought to prevent. The government bears the burden of demonstrat-
litical truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile;
that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an
inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government.")).
232. See, e.g., Brown, 456 U.S. at 52-54.
233. See RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,460-66 (1958).
234. See R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 395-96; Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199
(1992); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983); Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460-66.
235. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 196-99, 206-12.
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ing that the regulation will in fact address the problem of corruption
of the electoral process.236 Since the Web sites were only capable of
putting individuals in contact with one another by e-mail, the exis-
tence of coercion was fanciful at best.237 Moreover, given the lack of
proximity to the polls and the voluntary nature of participation in the
program, governmental regulation of the solicitation of votes was an
impermissible burden.3 s
VI. CONCLUSION
The vote-swap phenomenon was the result of thousands of peo-
ple nationvide coming together in the new town square to associate
for the furtherance of a common political goal. Had this happened in
a traditional meeting room, few would question its legality. How-
ever, the secretaries of state of California and Oregon acted out of
unfamiliarity with the new technology and imperiled the most fun-
damental of constitutional rights. The Constitution demands that any
government actor wishing to restrict the fundamental rights to free
speech and assembly bear a heavy burden, 39 something which the
secretaries of state did not carry; nor would they be able to.
The actions of the secretaries of state were invalid under the
very laws they sought to apply. As demonstrated above, California
law does not characterize a swapped vote as "valuable considera-
tion." Likewise, under Oregon's voting corruption law, the element
of "undue influence" remains unmet.
240
A citizen pledging to swap votes voted his or her conscience,
unpoliced and unobserved in the voting booth.241 Even the state of
Oregon admitted that there was no way to ascertain how a person
236. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 624, 664-68 (1994)
(illustrating that the government bears the burden of demonstrating that its re-
strictions will prevent the alleged harms in a direct and material way).
237. See Brief for Plaintiffs at 14, Porter v. Jones (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-
11700).
238. See id.; Burson, 504 U.S. at 210; Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-
20 (1966).
239. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 199.
240. See Interview with Jennifer Hertel, supra note 116.
241. See Brief for Plaintiffs at 2, Porter v. Jones (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-
11700).
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voted.242 A citizen pledging to vote could have changed his or her
mind, and in fact may not even have been a citizen or a registered
voter.243 Users of the Web sites could have used fictitious or multi-
ple e-mail addresses or identities, for no information on the Web site
or through the entire arrangement is verifiable.
244
Even if the agreement could be verified, what would have oc-
curred was that voters would have cast their votes in order to achieve
their preferred political goal albeit in a nontraditional manner. Be-
fore the threats of prosecution, these Web sites acted as facilitators of
political association and speech.245  They asked users a series of
questions about their political goals and geographic location, then
used that information to match them up with other users with com-
plementary political goals. Once so matched, two voters could ar-
range a coordinated political action.
246
However, the controlling fact in this case was that vote swap-
ping is protected by the Federal Constitution. Despite the fact that
the users of vote-swapping sites communicated in a nontraditional
manner, voting to achieve a political goal is the essence of democ-
racy.247 The vote-swapping Web sites took the consensus building of
the political meeting and political speech from the town hall and
transferred them into cyberspace. The fact that the political meeting
and discussion took place in the digital world as opposed to a meet-
ing room does not change the level of constitutional protection that
was afforded.248 Vote swapping is legal, constitutionally protected,
242. See Interview with Jennifer Hertel, supra note 116 (stating that the in-
dividual voters would be in violation of Oregon Revised Statute section
260.665, but acknowledging that there would be no practical way to prosecute
individual voters due to the impossibility of verifying exactly how each voter
cast his or her ballot).
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See Brief for Plaintiffs at 11, Porter v. Jones (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-
11700).
246. See id. at 7.
247. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22 (1988) (stressing that the
First Amendment affords the highest level of protection to discussions of a de-
sire for political change or the merits of the proposed changes).
248. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868-70 (1997) (holding that restric-
tions on Web site content are afforded the same protection as traditional print).
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and should be recognized as such before it once again becomes an
electoral issue in 2004.
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